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Notes
THE CONTEMPT POWER AND LEGISLATIVE TRIBUNALS
One of the dangers of regulatory boards is that they may tend to
usurp the powers of the legislative branch, but an even greater
danger is their taking of powers which properly belong to the courts.

The editorial statement, above,1 appeared recently in a prominent
Canadian newspaper. It was part of a warning which, though hardly
novel, is of such extreme importance in the maintenance of a democratic system, that it warrants constant repetition. During the last
four decades, there has been a steady trend towards the dissemination
of central governmental powers as a result of an immense growth
in government activities and responsibilities. The main recipients of
these powers have been legislatively created tribunals formed to
administer the subject matter of the statute which constitutes them.
The legal profession in Canada, Britain, and the United States,2
has watched with increasing concern the gradual encroachment by
these tribunals on judicial powers which have traditionally belonged
solely to the courts. Such encroachment has been justified, allegedly,
by the need for administrative expediency. However, there are
obvious perils in placing such powers in the hands of officials who
are not trained to be judges, and who preside in tribunals which are
not bound by the time-tested procedure and rules of the courts.
One of the gravest of these perils is the obliteration of the distinction between the three basic branches of the government which are inherent in our Constitution. It has been said in England that Dicey's
great principle, the Rule of Law, is the reflection of a balance
between the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of government. While the distinction in constitutional branches should not
be tortured into Montesquieu's doctrine of a rigid separation of
powers, the identification of these three functions in one body tends to
bureaucracy in substitution for the judicial process.3

I Toronto Globe and Mail, January 7, 1963, p. 6.
2 In the United States, there has been an abundance of writing on the
conflict between the constitutional separation of powers and judicial aspects
of the authority of governmental agencies. For a helpful survey of the
problem generally, and the use of the contempt power by these agencies, see
Hart, An Introduction to Administrative Law, 205; Power of Legislative
Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 780; Legislative Power
to punish for Contempt, 3 Geo. W. L. Rev. 468; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
3For a vigorous defense of administrative tribunals see The Functions
of Tribunals in the Modern State by Dr. Edith Summerskill, British Journal
for Administrative Law, p. 93 in which the author emphasizes the great
volume of work accomplished by these tribunals which could not be handled
by the courts, the delay involved in making applications to the courts and
the advantages of an informal procedure.
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Of all the powers exercised by the courts, perhaps none is more
susceptible to misuse than the summary jurisdiction to punish for
contempt. The extraordinary nature of this power is best illustrated
by the following extract:
In all cases of contempt tried "brevi manu", the Judge plays a three fold
role. He is the party injured, he is the prosecutor, and he is the Judge.
And what is more, his power to punish for this contempt was till lately
unlimited. The contemner did not even possess the right of appeal;
in short, his right there is none to dispute. Judges have a power 4which
even the highest executive head of the state.., does not possess.
There is no doubt that such a power is essential to the maintenance of orderly proceedings and public respect which the courts
must enjoy if they are to function efficiently. Is it necessary, however,
to bestow the same unusual authority on administrative tribunals
in order that they may carry out their duties properly? An answer
to this question has been given recently by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Re Diamond and the Ontario Municipal Board.5 The Court
held that the Municipal Board had the power of an inferior court of
record to punish for contempt. For a better appreciation of the
ramifications of this decision, it is appropriate that we examine the
contempt power more closely.
The concept of contempt is very ancient and has been described
as being "coeval with the first foundation and institution' 6 of English
courts. Sir John Fox introduces his book on contempt with the
statement, "Rules for preserving discipline, essential to the administration of justice, came into existence with the law itself, and Contempt of Court (contemptus curiae) has been a recognized phrase
in English law from the twelfth century to the present time."7 Because
of its arbitrary nature, judges have asserted that the power exists
not for their own personal vindication, but for the public good as an
instrument to ensure the proper administration of justice. Lord
Justice Bowen stated that the power has been given to judges to
prevent any interference with the course of justice. "It is on that
ground and not on any exaggerated notion of the dignity of individuals that insults to Judges are not allowed." Chief Justice McRuer
puts it even more strongly when he writes:
I say with emphasis that the law of contempt of court does not exist for
the protection of judges but for the protection of the individual right
free from
of every citizen to an independent administration of justice
influence or intimidation by improper conduct of any sort 9
An adequate definition of contempt, though frequently attempted
by judges and writers, is difficult to formulate because the offence
is capable of so many manifestations. The best one can do is to pos4

Chand and Sarin, The Law of Contempt of Court and LegisZature
(2nd. ed., 1949) 74.
5 [1962] O.R. 328.
61R. v. Almon, (1765) Wilmot's Notes 243, 254.
7 Fox, The History of Contempt of Court,1.
89 in re Johnson (1887), 20 Q.B.D. 68 at 74.
McRuer, Criminal Contempt of Court Procedure (1952), 30 Can. Bar
Rev. 225 at 227.
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tulate a general definition and try for more precision by classifying
the numerous examples of contempt into broad categories. From the
leading authorities, it would appear that the basic element of the
offence is an act which tends to thwart the legal process either by
bringing it into disrepute or by interfering with its administration.
These acts have been classified as civil and criminal. A criminal
contempt is in the nature of a direct affront to the dignity and
authority of the court. A civil contempt is a defiance of the procedure or order of a court in a civil action. Oswald states:
... contempts which tend to bring the administration of justice into
scorn, or which tend to interfere with the due course of justice, are
criminal in their nature; ... contempt in disregarding orders or judgments of a Civil Court, or in not doing something ordered to be done
in a cause, is not criminal in its nature.lO
This distinction, although firmly rooted in the history of the .law of
contempt, is not as plain as the definition above suggests. For
example, it is clear that criminal contempt may be committed in a
civil action. In a case where an injunction order had been disobeyed,
it was held by the Supreme Court of Canada that such disobedience
amounted to criminal contempt punishable by the court on its own
motion even though the plaintiff had withdrawn its motion for the
committal of the defendent. In his judgment, Kellock, J. said:
There are many statements in the books that contempt proceedings
for breach of an injunction are civil process, but it Is obvious that
conduct which is in violation of an injunction may, in addition to Its civil
aspect, possess all the features of criminal contempt of court. In the
case of a breach of a purely civil nature, the requirements of the
situation from the standpoint of the enforcement of the rights of the
opposite party constitute the criterion upon which the Court acts. But
a punitive sentence is called for where
the act of violation has passed
beyond the realm of the purely civil.11
The discovery of the boundaries delineating that "realm of the
purely civil" has given difficulty to the courts in Anglo-American
jurisdictions, especially where such matters as the right of appeal,
the applicability of certain rules of evidence and liability for payment
of costs are involved.' 2
The merging of criminal with civil aspects of contempt is further
seen in a second broad classification that distinguishes direct from
constructive contempts. A direct contempt is one that is comnitted in
the face of the court and it appears that this offence is criminal in
nature whether it is committed in criminal or civil proceedings. Chief
Justice McRuer divides criminal contempt into three classes, the first
category being contempt committed in the face of the court, He states
that these contempts include:
10

Oswald, Contempt of Court, (3rd. ed.), 36.
11-Poje v. Atty.-Gen. of B.C., [1953J 1 S.C.R. 516 at 517; 2 D.L.R. 785at 787.
12For a fuller discussion of this problem, and that of classification In
general, see Chand and Sarin, supra,footnote 4, c. 3
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Demonstration in the courtroom by shouting and noisy behaviour;
applauding a verdict of a jury or decision of a judge; refusing to give
evidence when properly subpoened as a witness or to answer relevant
questions; refusing to leave the courtroom when ordered to do so or to
obey the orders of the court or its officers with respect to a trial which
abusive or disis in progress, whether civil or criminal, or using
13
respectful language to a judge presiding at the trials.

Constructive contempts are those committed outside the presence

14
of the court and may take the form of "scandalizing the court"

by an act or publication of matters which bring the administration
of justice into disrepute. This type of contempt may also be found

in an act or publication which tends to prejudice the fair trial of an
issue which is or will be before the courts.1 5

It is well established that all courts of record may punish direct

contempt summarily by fine or imprisonment or both, while superior
courts have the same power to punish both direct and constructive
contempt The existence of such power was strongly asserted in a
celebrated but undelivered judgment of Justice Wilmot, written in
1765. He stated:
It is a necessary incident to every Court of Justice, whether of record
or not, to fine and imprison for a contempt to the Court, acted in the
face of it. And the issuing of attachments by the Supreme Courts of
Justice in Westminster Hall, for contempts out of Court, stands upon
immemorial usage as supports the whole fabric of the Common
the same
16
Law.
Legal historians have cast doubt upon the "immemorial usage" of
which Wilmot writes, but the judgment has been cited so often and
its principles are so firmly imbedded in the law, that its accuracy
has never seriously been questioned. ir. Justice McGillivray has
spoken of the power as "a right in the Courts which has become
so well rooted in judicial practice that nothing other than legislative
action can take it away."' 17
13 Oswold, supra, footnote 9, at 227. Further instances of this kind
of contempt may be found in Oswald, c. 3. The commonest example of
such contempt in civil actions appears now to be the disobedience of injunctions. There are also several cases of misconduct by a counsel. In
re Duncan, [1958] S.C.R. 41, 11 D.L.R. (2nd) 616, a counsel was found to be
in contempt of court for his suggestion that the interests of justice would
be better served if a certain member of the bench absented himself.
14The phrase appears to have been first used by Lord Hardwicke in
Read v. Huggonson (1742) 2 Ath. 469 at 471. For an interesting modern case
on "scandalizing" the court, see R. v. The Vancouver Province, (re Nicol), 12
W.W.R. (N.S.) 349; 108 Can. C.C. 355; [1954] 3 D.L.R. 690, in which a well
known Canadian humorist wrote an allegory on the subject of capital
punishment.
15
Per Lord Russell in The Queen v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36 at p. 40. "Any
act done or writing published, calculated to obstruct or interfere with the
due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts is a contempt of
Court." In Re Dorion (1953), 17 C.R. 352, 10 W.W.R. (N.S.) 379, the court
held that a newspaper should not publish a document not admitted in
evidence during the trial. In R. v. McDonald, [1939] 4 D.L.R. 377, [1939]
O.W.N. 548, contempt was found in the act of selling a fictional account of
a murder accompanied by a picture of the accused shortly before the trial.
16 Supra,footnote 6 at p. 254.
17
Re Campbe7l v. Cowper, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 633, at 651.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.2:482

In the light of this brief discussion of contempt, what is the
extent of the power which has been given to the Ontario Municipal
Board? Re Diamond was an application to the Court of Appeal in
the form of a stated case pursuant to section 93 of the Ontario
Municipal Board Act. 18
The major question to be determined was whether the Municipal
Board, by its enabling legislation, which gave it the rights and privileges of the Supreme Court with respect to the attendance and
examination of wiltnesses, 1 9 could compel witnesses to answer, and
following a refusal to answer, commit a witness to jail. The respondents asserted that the Board was not in fact a court of record and
did not have the capacity to receive powers that were essentially
judicial. Alternatively, it was argued that since the contempt power
held such potentiality for interference with individual liberty, that
it should not be attributed to an administrative body in the absence

of the most unambiguous language. Schroeder, J.A., after reviewing
the sparse authorities, held that the Board had the power to punish
for contempt committed in the face of the court. He states at page
331,
S. 33 The Board for all purposes of this Act has all the powers of a court
of record and shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noted.
S. 37 The Board for the due exercise of its jurisdiction and powers
has all such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in the Supreme
Court with respect to the amendment of proceedings, addition or substitution
of parties, attendance and examination of witnesses, production and inspection of documents . . . enforcement of its orders and all other matters

necessary or proper therefor.
It is necessary in many cases for the Board, in discharging its functions,
to ascertain the facts with which it has to deal, and in the conduct of
its enquiries it is essential that it possess incidental powers commonly
associated with a Court of Justice. If it were not invested with the power
to punish a witness who refuses to be sworn ...

or refuses to answer

a question when directed to do so, the administrative machinery of the
Board would soon grind to a halt, for the most effective direct sanction
commonly available to compel obedience to such an order or direction
is the power to hold a recalcitrant witness in contempt and, as a means
of coercion, to commit him to prison.

In studying the effects of this decision, it is important to realize
that the language found in section 3720 of the Ontario Municipal
Board Act is not peculiar to this statute. Similar words which confer
the powers of a court of record for matters such as the summoning
and examination of witnesses may be found in the enabling legislation
of many other boards and commissions. 2 '
18 R.S.O. 1960, c. 274.
19 See Ontario Municipal Board Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 274.
2OIbid.
21
See, for example, the powers of the Board of Transport Commissioners
in the Railway Act R.S.C. 1952, c. 234, s. 33(3); of the Ontario Labour
Relations Board in the Labour Relations Act R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, s. 77(2) (a);
of the Ontario Workmen's Compensation Board in the Workmen's Compensation Act R.S.O. 1960, c. 437, s. 65. Similar powers are given to royal commissions constituted federally under the Inquiries Act R.S.C. 1952, 6. 154, s. 4
and 5 and in Ontario under the Public Inquiries Act R.S.O. 1960, c. 323, s. 2.
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It is paradoxical that this power, which judges have cautioned
themselves to use only sparingly and under extreme circumstances,2
should be given so freely to officials who may have had no legal training whatsoever. It is undoubtedly true, as Mr. Justice Schroeder
states above, that without an adequate sanction, the work of these
tribunals may be severely hampered. However, is this particular
power, notwithstanding its advantages of being a quick and effective
remedy, the proper sanction?
In answering that question, it is necessary to consider two points.
First, contempt committed in the face of the court, as we have seen,
includes within its boundaries, much more than a mere refusal to
answer a question or attend a hearing. Insolence directed at a judge,
creating a disturbance in the court, attempts to influence the judge,
interference with other witnesses or officials of the court and unseemly behaviour by a counsel are but a few examples of this kind
of contempt.23 Any of these acts might be committed during the
performance of the general powers of examination which have been
given to many boards and commissions.24 According to the Diamond
case, therefore, an official insulted by a witness during the course of
examination could exercise the contempt power. Are such members
of legislative tribunals competent to pass judgment on all types of
direct contempt? Is this not a purely judicial power which should
lie outside the scope of administrative authority?
Secondly, there is the question of appeal. The determination
of the right to appeal has depended traditionally on whether the
act of contempt was civil or criminal. In the case of criminal contempt, there was no right of appeal prior to the re-enactment of the
Criminal Code in 1954.25 On the other hand, a committal or fine for
civil contempt, as a result of a motion by one of the parties in a
civil action, could be appealed.
Section 9 (1) of the Criminal Code states,
Where a court, judge, justice or magistrate summarily convicts a person
for a contempt of court committed in the face of the court and imposes
punishment in respect thereof, that person may appeal against the
punishment imposed.

It will be noticed that the section gives the right of appeal from
punishment by a "court, judge, justice or magistrate". There is no
provision for an appeal from an administrative tribunal. Thus, if
22

Lord Morris in McLeod v. St. Aubyn, [18991 A.C. 549 at 561, states:
"Committal for contempt of Court is a weapon to be used sparingly, and
always with reference to the interests of the administration of justice." See
also Chancellor Boyd in Meriden Britannia Co. Ltd. v. Walters (1915), 34
O.L.R. 518 at 520: "Sir George Jessel's judicial admonition was, that such
arbitrary and unlimited jurisdiction should be jealously and carefully watched,
and exercised with anxiety and reluctance: In re Clements (1877), 46 L.J.
Ch.23375, 383."
24 Supra, footnote 13.
Supra footnote 21.
25 S.C. 1953-54, 2-3 Eliz. II, c. 51. See, for example, Poje v. Atty.-Gen. of
B.C.. supra footnote 11, decided in 1953, in which it was held that no appeal
lay from the order for committal in a case of criminal contempt.
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contempts committed in the face of such a tribunal are criminal,
(and it is submitted that, in spite of the difficulties of classification,
they are,)2 6 there is no right of appeal as the law now stands.
It is contended, therefore, that the direct contempt power, as
it has been exercised by the courts, is not the proper sanction for
the use of bodies other than courts. Obviously, however, these bodies
need some measure of disciplinary authority. For the most part, such
authority is necessary only to force persons to attend a hearing or
inquiry and to answer the questions put to them. There could be
no objection if administrative tribunals exercised a power to fine
or imprison for these purposes alone.2 7 For all other acts of contempt,
application could be made by the tribunal to a superior court judge
for a proper adjudication. This proposal requires that the Diamond
case, which was a refusal to answer, be limited to its facts. The advantages of such restricted authority would be to allow a board or
commission to exercise a sanction appropriate to its administrative
duties without usurping powers which have always belonged exclusively to the courts. In addition, legislation should be passed to
complement section 9 of the Criminal Code and ensure that punishment imposed by non-judicial bodies in the limited circumstances
that have been suggested be subject to an appeal.
In England, a scheme has been advanced for the establishment
of an administrative division of the High Court which would have
general appellate and supervisory jurisdiction over all the administrative agencies. The idea was considered and rejected in a report to
Parliament by the Lord Chancellor in 1957.28 The primary objection
was that such a plan would result in appeals from expert tribunals
to an inexpert appellate body. The converse of that objection lends
support to the proposals recommended here. Surely, it is inadvisable
26

Supra, footnote 13, and especially the Poje case, supra, footnote 11, In

which Kellock J.discusses the two types of contempt extensively. He adopts
the view advanced by IAndley L.J. in Seaward's Case, [1897J 1 Ch.545, wh ch
draws a distinction between contempt proceedings as mere process against
a party for the purpose of compelling obedience to an order of the court in
the interests of the party obtaining it and an act which the court feels Is an
obstruction of justice. In the latter case, the court can act on Its own
motion. This power is given to the Ontario Municipal Board by the Diamond
case and, by implication, to all other legislative bodies which enjoy the same
kind of enabling legislation. The confusion shown by the courts in classifying
these types of contempt is demonstrated by the recent case of Re Gaglardi
(1961), 27 D.L.R. (2d) 281. In dealing with an appeal from a contempt
citation for knowingly assisting in the violation of an injunction order, the
British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed both a criminal and civil appeal,
and treated these as alternative arguments in the same proceedings.
27
e CanadianBill of Rights S.C. 1960,, 8-9 Eliz. II, c. 44, provides protec.
tion for persons who are forced to answer the questions of any tribunal by
stating in section 2,

"...

no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so

as to,
(d) authorize a court, tribunal, commission, board or other authority
to give evidence if he is denied counsel's protection against self
crimination or other constitutional safeguards."
2
SReport of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals, (The Franks
Committee) Cmd. 218, at 29.
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to take away powers from judges who are trained to exercise them
properly and give them to inexpert bodies.
There is no doubt that legislative tribunals render invaluable
assistance in the performance of government activities. As well as
their purely administrative duties, these bodies undertake an immense
amount of work of a judicial nature that could not possibly be
carried out by the courts. However, the mere fact that such work
is being performed by tribunals other than courts does not justify
their elevation to what is essentially the status of a court of law.
As the report noted above states in its concluding words:2
We regard both tribunals and administrative procedures as essential to
our society. But we hope that we have equally indicated our view that
the administration should not use these methods of adjudication as convenient alternatives to courts of law. We wish to emphasize that in
deciding by whom adjudications involving the administration and the
individual citizen should be carried out, preference should be given to
the ordinary courts of law rather than to a tribunal unless there are
demonstrably special reasons which makes a tribunal more appropriate...
This passage recognizes the importance of maintaining the courts
as a separate and supreme judicial authority. Thus, it is only proper
that a power which is as ancient as the courts themselves and, in its
very arbitrariness, symbolic of the unique position of judges, should
be kept to the greatest possible extent within the domain of the
judiciary.
C. C. JOHNSTONW

SECTION 76 AND 77 OF THE CHILD WELFARE ACT. In
1958 the Ontario Legislature ostensibly gave effect to the current
of social opinion in favor of equating the legal positions of adopted
children with those born in lawful wedlock through amendments to
the Child Welfare Act.' Section 76 of the Act provides that:
(1) For all purposes the adopted child, upon the adoption order being
made, becomes the child of the adopting parent and the adopting
parent becomes the parent of the adopted child as if the adopted
child had been born in lawful wedlock to the adopting parent.
(2) For all purposes the adopted child, upon the adoption order being
made, ceases to be the child of the person who was his parent before
the adoption order was made and that person ceases to be the
parent of the adopted child. (Italics added).
Section 77 of the Act provides that the above provisions apply
to every person heretofore adopted under the laws of Ontario and
to every person adopted under the laws of any other province or
territory of Canada or under the laws of any other country.
Thus, it appeared that the culmination of the progressive legislative process of placing the adopted child in the position of his
naturally-born counterpart had been reached. Yet the decision of the
*Mr. Johnston is in third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
29Ibid, p. 89.
1 R.S.O. 1960, c. 53.

